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RETHINKING EXTRAORDINARY CIRCUMSTANCES 
Scott Dodson* 
INTRODUCTION 
Normally, the entry of an unappealed final judgment ends the case 
forever, even if later developments undermine faith in the accuracy of the 
decision or the fairness of its procedural grounds.  Litigation must have an 
end, and a final judgment usually marks that point. 
Rule 60(b), however, has long been available to provide relief from 
judgment to losing litigants where justice so demands.  The rule states that a 
court may relieve a party from final judgment ―[o]n motion and just terms‖ 
under five enumerated grounds (including mistake, newly discovered 
evidence, fraud, voidness, and judgment satisfaction) and one catchall 
provision.1  The catchall, Rule 60(b)(6), provides that a court can relieve a 
party from judgment for ―any other reason that justifies relief.‖2 
Because a judgment constitutes a final decision, Rule 60 creates some 
tension between justice and finality.  To address this tension, the Supreme 
Court has imposed the nontextual requirement that a movant present 
―extraordinary circumstances‖ justifying relief.3  Further, in Ackermann v. 
United States, the Court held that a movant was not entitled to relief if his 
own litigation choices caused his predicament.4  In Ackermann, the 
plaintiff’s calculated financial decision not to appeal his denaturalization 
turned out to be a poor litigation choice after his co-plaintiff was able to 
overturn a similar denaturalization on appeal.  The Court reasoned that 
Ackermann’s own deliberate choice to end his litigation prevented him 
from invoking Rule 60(b)(6) to reopen his case after learning the favorable 
result of his co-plaintiff’s appeal.5 
Since then, the federal courts have done little to explain or expound 
upon the Ackermann rule.  However, in July 2011, the Fourth Circuit sitting 
en banc decided Aikens v. Ingram and attempted to elaborate on the 
Ackermann rule.6  The court held that, under Ackermann, a district court 
could deny Rule 60(b)(6) relief to a plaintiff faced with a limitations 
 
*
  Associate Professor of Law, William & Mary Law School. 
1
  FED. R. CIV. P. 60(b) (link). 
2
  Id. 60(b)(6). 
3
  See, e.g., Liljeberg v. Health Servs. Acquisition Corp., 486 U.S. 847, 863–64 & n.11 (1988) 
(quoting Klapprott v. United States, 335 U.S. 601, 613–14 (1949)) (link).  This rule is known as the 
―extraordinary circumstances‖ doctrine. 
4
  340 U.S. 193 (1950) (link). 
5
  Id. at 196–97. 
6
  No. 08-2278, 2011 WL 2725811 (4th Cir. July 13, 2011) (en banc) (link). 
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defense to a new filing if the plaintiff could have protected his claim by 
appealing the judgment, seeking a stay, or filing a new action.7 
Aikens is an important but misguided pronouncement from a full 
circuit court on the extraordinary circumstances doctrine and the role and 
scope of the Ackermann rule.  It applies the Ackermann rule too broadly, 
causing the exception to almost entirely swallow the rule.  As a result, 
Aikens relegates Rule 60(b)(6) to the dustbins of legal practice. 
Rule 60(b)(6) is an oft-used provision invoked by litigants who 
otherwise would be saddled with an unjust judgment.8  Yet despite the 
importance of the topic, the literature on Rule 60(b)(6) is some of the 
sparsest in all of civil procedure.  Neither Aikens II nor any other court or 
commentator has systematically theorized the Ackermann rule and its role 
in the extraordinary circumstances doctrine.  This Essay takes an initial step 
toward rethinking extraordinary circumstances and the role of the 
Ackermann rule.  Specifically, I argue that Ackermann should apply only 
when the movant deliberately chooses to discontinue the case.  It should not 
apply to movants who continue to pursue their claims with diligence.  This 
interpretation of the Ackermann rule more sensitively balances the 
competing interests of equity and finality. 
Applying these guiding principles to Aikens suggests that the Fourth 
Circuit overstated the role and scope of the Ackermann exception.  In so 
doing, Aikens missed a golden chance to provide doctrinal guidance and 
theoretical coherence to this understudied but widely used mechanism of 
civil practice. 
I. RULE 60(B)(6) 
Before the adoption of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in 1938, 
federal courts used a haphazard assortment of common law remedial 
devices to balance the need to correct unjust judgments with the need for 
finality in litigation.9  The original Rule 60(b) largely replaced this 
patchwork with specific procedures and limits for granting relief from 
judgment.  But, some courts nevertheless invoked ―inherent powers‖ to 
issue relief on terms that contravened those procedures and limits.10  The 
1948 Amendments altered some of the requirements and added 
Rule 60(b)(6), a catchall provision that recognized that the need for justice 
might outweigh the need for finality in unanticipated circumstances.11  
Rule 60(b), set forth below, has remained substantively unchanged since: 
 
7
  Id. at *4–5. 
8
  For a discussion of Rule 60(b)(6), Ackermann, and the many cases following, see 11 CHARLES 
ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 2864 (2d ed. 2011). 
9
  See Note, Federal Rule 60(b): Relief from Civil Judgments, 61 YALE L.J. 76, 76 & n.3 (1952). 
10
  Id. at 77–78. 
11
  See id. at 82 n.31. 
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On motion and just terms, the court may relieve a party or 
its legal representative from a final judgment, order, or 
proceeding for the following reasons: 
(1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable 
neglect; 
(2) newly discovered evidence that, with reasonable 
diligence, could not have been discovered in time to 
move for a new trial under Rule 59(b); 
(3) fraud (whether previously called intrinsic or 
extrinsic), misrepresentation, or misconduct by an 
opposing party; 
(4) the judgment is void; 
(5) the judgment has been satisfied, released or 
discharged; it is based on an earlier judgment that has 
been reversed or vacated; or applying it prospectively 
is no longer equitable; or 
(6) any other reason that justifies relief.12 
 
All of the Rule 60(b) justifications erode the finality of judgments, 
which ―secure[s] the peace and repose of society.‖13  Accordingly, 
Rule 60(b)(1)–(5) specify particular justifications for overriding the 
interests of finality.14  Rule 60(b)(6), however, presents a unique risk 
because its open-endedness invites judges to subordinate the interests of 
finality even when those interests might be especially strong.  Textually, 
Rule 60(b)(6) appears to have no constraint other than whether a reason 
―justifies relief.‖  Accordingly, courts often cast it broadly, construing it as 
―a grand reservoir of equitable power to do justice in a particular case.‖15  
To guard against the overuse of Rule 60(b)(6), the Supreme Court has 
interpreted Rule 60(b)(6) to require a showing of ―extraordinary 
circumstances‖ justifying relief.16  In Ackermann v. United States, the Court 
held that, under this extraordinary circumstances doctrine, the movant’s 
individual litigation choices could preclude Rule 60(b)(6) relief. 
 
12
  FED. R. CIV. P. 60(b). 
13
  S. Pac. R.R. Co. v. United States, 168 U.S. 1, 48–49 (1897) (link).  On the balance of finality and 
equity, see Henry Brownstein, Note, Rule 60(b): A Rule Suitable for a Sua Sponte Motion, 15 B.U. PUB. 
INT. L.J. 153, 165–66 (2005) (link). 
14
  FED. R. CIV. P. 60(b)(1)–(5). 
15
  See Christopher G. Meadows, Comment, Rule 60(b)(6): Whether “Tapping the Grand Reservoir 
of Equitable Power” Is Appropriate to Right an Attorney’s Wrong, 88 MARQ. L. REV. 997, 999 (2005) 
(internal quotation marks omitted) (link). 
16
  Ackermann v. United States, 340 U.S. 193, 199 (1950); cf. Gonzalez v. Crosby, 545 U.S. 524, 
535 (2005) (considering the extraordinary circumstances doctrine in the habeas context) (link). 
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In Ackermann, Hans Ackermann and his business partner, Max 
Keilbar, were denaturalized on grounds of fraud.  The denaturalizations 
were entered as separate judgments.  Ackermann did not appeal during the 
allowable time period, primarily because he believed he could not bear the 
high cost of appealing the judgment.  Keilbar, however, appealed and won a 
reversal of his denaturalization order.  Upon receiving the news of Keilbar’s 
reversal, Ackermann believed that his denaturalization similarly should be 
reversed.  Because the time to appeal had lapsed, he sought to reopen his 
denaturalization judgment under Rule 60(b)(6).17 
The Supreme Court held that Ackermann was not entitled to 
Rule 60(b)(6) relief, even if his denaturalization judgment was erroneous, 
because he 
 
made a considered choice not to appeal . . . .  His choice 
was a risk, but calculated and deliberate and such as 
follows a free choice.  Petitioner cannot be relieved of such 
a choice because hindsight seems to indicate to him that his 
decision not to appeal was probably wrong[,] considering 
the outcome of the Keilbar case.  There must be an end to 
litigation someday, and free, calculated, deliberate choices 
are not to be relieved from.18 
 
The Ackermann rule attempts to provide the one concrete guidepost for 
determining whether a case presents extraordinary circumstances justifying 
Rule 60(b)(6) relief.  Yet it too is unclear.  Does the rule apply to all free, 
calculated, and deliberate litigation choices?  The recent decision in Aikens 
v. Ingram exposes the difficulty of this question. 
II. A CASE STUDY: AIKENS V. INGRAM 
In Aikens, Colonel Frederick Aikens, an active officer in the North 
Carolina National Guard until 2005, sued his former superior officer, 
William Ingram, and his former subordinate, Peter von Jess, under § 1983 
and the Fourth Amendment for ―wrongfully intercepting, reading, and 
forwarding his emails while he was deployed in Kuwait‖ during the Iraq 
War.19 
The district court dismissed Aikens’s complaint without prejudice for 
failure to exhaust intraservice remedies with the Army Board for the 
Correction of Military Records (ABCMR), a federal agency division 
charged with hearing grievances regarding federal military records.20  The 
 
17
  Ackermann, 340 U.S. at 195–96. 
18
  Id. at 198. 
19
  Aikens v. Ingram, No. 08-2278, 2011 WL 2725811, at *1 (4th Cir. July 21, 2011) (en banc). 
20
  Aikens v. Ingram, 513 F. Supp. 2d 586, 592 (E.D.N.C. 2007) (link). 
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district court’s order stated that if the ABCMR did not have jurisdiction, it 
would take no action and the ―plaintiff may return to federal court.‖21 
Aikens then attempted to comply with the district court order by 
seeking relief from the ABCMR.  However, because the ABCMR could 
only order federal military records relief and not the state records relief and 
monetary damages that Aikens sought, the ABCMR held that it lacked 
jurisdiction to entertain Aikens’s request.22 
By this time, the three-year limitations period on Aikens’s § 1983 
claims had lapsed (assuming no tolling had occurred during the pendency of 
the ABCMR’s review).  Accordingly, and now having exhausted his 
intraservice remedies, Aikens filed a Rule 60(b)(6) motion to reopen his 
original case.  The district court denied Aikens’s motion, holding that any 
limitations problem was Aikens’s own fault for two reasons: (1) Aikens 
waited two years and five months into the limitations period to file his 
original complaint and (2) Aikens failed to exhaust his intraservice 
remedies with the ABCMR before filing suit.23  Aikens appealed. 
The Fourth Circuit, sitting en banc, affirmed the district court in a 7–5 
decision that generated four separate opinions.  The Fourth Circuit wisely 
ignored the district court’s reasons for the denial of Rule 60(b)(6) relief.  
Potential plaintiffs may use much of the limitations period for a number of 
reasons, including to seek informal remediation, to use formal but 
nonjudicial grievance procedures, to consider the costs and benefits of 
litigation, to find and hire an attorney, to investigate facts and legal theories, 
to consider legal strategies, and to draft a complaint.  That Aikens used up a 
significant amount of his limitations period is unsurprising because such 
use is, in part, what the limitations period is designed to encourage.  It 
would be preposterous to fault Aikens for proceeding carefully and 
thoughtfully through these stages before filing a timely complaint.  It would 
be equally preposterous to fault Aikens for failing to attempt to exhaust his 
intraservice remedies when the ABCMR conclusively determined that any 
attempt would have been futile. 
Instead of deferring to the district court’s reasons, the Fourth Circuit 
relied upon its own reasons.  The court held that Aikens should have 
appealed the district court’s dismissal order, sought a stay of the dismissal 
order pending exhaustion, or filed a new action before the limitations period 
expired.  Because Aikens declined to pursue these options, the majority 
reasoned that the limitations predicament he now faced was his own fault, 
and therefore, the district court’s denial of Rule 60(b)(6) relief was not an 
abuse of discretion.24 
 
21
  Id. at 591–92. 
22
  Aikens, 2011 WL 2725811, at *2. 
23
  Aikens v. Ingram, No. 06-CV-185, 2008 WL 4831420, at *5 (E.D.N.C. Nov. 5, 2008) (link), 
aff’d, No. 08-2278, 2011 WL 2725811 (4th Cir. July 21, 2011) (en banc). 
24
  Aikens, 2011 WL 2725811, at *4–5. 
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Although an appellate court can affirm on grounds other than those 
relied upon by the district court, the abuse-of-discretion standard then does 
not apply to the district court’s decision.  Rather, an appellate court can 
affirm on alternate grounds only if, after an independent de novo review, it 
determines that the judgment was, in fact, correct.25 
Thus, the Fourth Circuit, despite its language purporting to defer to the 
discretion of the district court and the concurring opinion’s lengthy defense 
of the abuse-of-discretion standard, affirmed for its own reasons and its 
own independent belief in their merit.26  In the process, the Fourth Circuit 
created new law on the extraordinary circumstances doctrine by extending 
the reach of the Ackermann rule.  Now, Rule 60(b)(6) relief is never 
available if the movant could have appealed, sought a stay, or filed a new 
action but deliberately chose not to do so. 
That can’t be right.  Such a rule requires perfect foresight in choosing 
among reasonable litigation options.  If litigants had perfect foresight in 
their litigation choices, it is hard to see when Rule 60(b)(6) relief would be 
needed.  And, if it were needed, the reason would almost certainly be 
because of the litigant’s failure to make litigation choices with perfect 
foresight.  The Ackermann rule would swallow Rule 60(b)(6).27 
Aikens’s case is a perfect example.  When the district court dismissed 
his claim for failure to exhaust his intraservice remedies, he had a choice.  
As the Fourth Circuit recognized, he could have appealed.  But the district 
court had cited to Fourth Circuit precedent that seemed to support the 
exhaustion requirement, and so the option of appealing might simply have 
led to an affirmance, putting him right back where he was after dismissal.28  
He also could have sought a stay while he went to exhaust, but the language 
of the district court’s order, which did not direct the clerk to close the case, 
 
25
  See Helvering v. Gowran, 302 U.S. 238, 245–46 (1937) (explaining that an appellate court can 
affirm for new reasons ―if the decision below is correct‖) (link). 
26
  The Fourth Circuit did not appear to appreciate that it was misapplying the abuse-of-discretion 
standard.  It purported to rely on the abuse-of-discretion standard while nevertheless rejecting the district 
court’s reasons.  See Aikens, 2011 WL 2725811, at *4–5. 
27
  As the dissent argued: 
 
If the majority’s approach is all it takes to foreclose a finding of extraordinary 
circumstances for Rule 60(b)(6) relief, that is, if a court can punish a movant for 
pursuing reasonable and legitimate strategies simply because—with the benefit of 
hindsight—the court can conjure up possible alternatives, it is hard to imagine 
that Rule 60(b)(6) relief can ever be obtained. 
 
See id. at *20 (King, J., dissenting). 
28
  See Aikens v. Ingram, 513 F. Supp. 2d 586, 591 (E.D.N.C. 2007) (citing Fourth Circuit decisions 
requiring the exhaustion of intraservice remedies).  It is worth noting that Aikens’s Rule 60(b)(6) motion 
was not a substitute for an appeal seeking to reverse the district court’s order holding that exhaustion 
was required.  Such a reversal would be unnecessary because by then Aikens had in fact exhausted his 
administrative remedies. 
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suggested that the district court would leave the case pending while 
exhaustion was attempted.  When the district court issued a final judgment 
the next day, the district court had no power to enter a stay of its dismissal 
order without some justification for reconsideration.29  And even if the 
district court agreed to consider Aikens’s request for a stay, there was no 
assurance that the district court would have granted it. 
In light of the uncertainty of an appeal or a stay, Aikens chose a 
different option: he chose to attempt to exhaust.  Aikens did not care where 
his remedy came from, and he no doubt would rather have gotten it 
immediately from the ABCMR than wait years through the appeals process.  
Plus, the district court had assured Aikens that if the ABCMR could not 
grant him relief, then he could return to court.  Aikens’s decision to comply 
with the district court’s order and seek administrative relief was a perfectly 
reasonable way to continue the pursuit of his claims.  Indeed, it might have 
been unreasonable for Aikens to have done anything differently. 
When the ABCMR refused his claim, Aikens could have filed a new 
action instead of a Rule 60(b)(6) motion, as the Fourth Circuit pointed out.  
Yet the limitations issue was uncertain at that time; any new suit would be 
timely only if the limitations period had been tolled during the pendency of 
his original action and during the time he sought to exhaust.  Further, a new 
lawsuit before a judge unfamiliar with the issues and the parties would have 
required duplicative litigation, with its attendant costs to the parties and the 
court.  Far safer and more efficient, Aikens must have thought, to simply 
return to where he had left off.  The district court invited him to return to 
federal court, and having jumped through the hoop ordered by the court, 
Aikens merely accepted that invitation. 
Thus, at the time, Aikens’s litigation choices were perfectly reasonable 
ones.  True, Aikens freely made them.  But it is hardly just to fault him for 
them.  After all, Aikens could have been put in similarly difficult positions 
if he did as the Fourth Circuit suggested.  If Aikens had appealed and the 
Fourth Circuit affirmed, would Aikens be faulted for appealing instead of 
seeking to exhaust his remedies first?  If Aikens had sought a stay and the 
district court denied it after the thirty-day deadline to file an appeal had 
expired,30 would Aikens be faulted for choosing to seek a discretionary form 
of relief instead of an appeal as of right?  If Aikens had instead filed a new 
action, and the district court rejected any tolling arguments and dismissed 
on limitations grounds, would he be faulted for failing to choose to appeal 
or seek a stay?  These rhetorical questions are designed to elicit a point: it is 
highly problematic to condition Rule 60(b)(6) relief on speculation of 
which litigation choice, among a variety of reasonable options in pursuit of 
 
29
  Once the final judgment was entered, the district court was without power to issue a stay without 
some additional filing by Aikens seeking reconsideration, such as a motion under Rule 59 or Rule 60.  
See FED. R. CIV. P. 62(b) (link). 
30
  This deadline is jurisdictional.  See Bowles v. Russell, 551 U.S. 205, 213 (2007) (link). 
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the claim, might have been more successful.  In Aikens’s case, any one of 
them could have been unwise in retrospect.  To deny Rule 60(b)(6) relief 
just because the option the movant selected turned out to be unsuccessful 
with 20/20 hindsight is to permit Rule 60(b)(6) relief only when it is not 
needed. 
III. BALANCING RULE 60(B)(6) WITH ACKERMANN 
For these reasons, the Ackermann rule ought not apply when a litigant 
chooses a litigation option that is a reasonable way to continue pressing his 
legal claims.  I do not mean to place emphasis on the word ―reasonable‖ 
here.  I include that qualification in my proposal only as a way of excluding 
patently unreasonable or fanciful ways of continuing the pursuit of a 
claim—disobeying a court order, pursuing a course clearly foreclosed by 
binding precedent, and the like.  In such cases, I have no qualms accepting a 
rule that forces the litigant to live with his mistakes.  However, I suspect 
(and intend) that such unreasonable choices will be rare. 
I mean instead to focus on a litigant’s intention to continue pressing 
claims.  In such a case, the concerns of finality are light.  Indeed, the district 
court’s dismissal order was without prejudice and specifically contemplated 
a return to federal court.  Meanwhile, Aikens himself continued to pursue 
his claims for relief with the ABCMR (a perfectly reasonable choice, for the 
reasons stated above).  For all practical purposes, his case against the 
defendants was continuing.  Finality interests were light, if not absent 
entirely. 
Consequently, the Ackermann rule ought to apply only to a litigation 
choice that deliberately ends the dispute, such as settling the claims or 
abandoning the case altogether.  In that circumstance, the finality concerns 
are real, the defendant has an expectation interest in the end of the case, and 
sour grapes need not be rewarded. 
This construction is consistent with Ackermann and its progeny.  
Ackermann involved a movant who declined to appeal, primarily for 
financial reasons, and failed to pursue his claims in any other forum.  In 
Polites v. United States, another Rule 60(b)(6) case, a denaturalized citizen 
stipulated to a voluntary dismissal of his appeal with prejudice because 
circuit precedent was unfavorable at the time and only moved for 
Rule 60(b)(6) relief after there was a supervening change in the law.31  
Similarly, Gonzalez v. Crosby involved a habeas petitioner who failed to 
appeal the denial of his petition and sought Rule 60(b)(6) relief only after a 
 
31
  364 U.S. 426, 430–31 (1960) (link). 
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supervening change in the law.32  In each case, the Supreme Court held the 
denial of Rule 60(b)(6) relief to be proper.33 
In these cases, the movants deliberately abandoned their claims 
completely and did not pursue them in any other legal forum.  Those 
movants sat on their laurels, biding their time and saving their resources 
until a change in the law, which they could have argued for in the first 
instance, turned in their favor and gave them new hope.  In such cases, the 
finality interests are strong and the justice interests are arguably light.  
Thus, the Ackermann rule might properly apply to them. 
Fred Aikens, by contrast, never gave up pursuing his claims.  His 
circumstances therefore presented a far different case than Ackermann and 
its progeny.  In Aikens’s case, the finality interests were light and the 
justice interests were strong.  Accordingly, the Ackermann rule should not 
have prevented him from seeking Rule 60(b)(6) relief.  His case thus 
illustrates the proper scope of the Ackermann rule: the rule should disallow 
Rule 60(b)(6) relief only when the movant deliberately chooses to end the 
dispute. 
CONCLUSION 
Rule 60(b)(6), with its requirement of extraordinary circumstances, has 
caused discord among the courts.  The Ackermann rule, while providing 
some guidance, is of uncertain scope.  At its broadest, the Ackermann rule 
threatens to swallow Rule 60(b)(6) and tip the balance too far in favor of 
finality.  This Essay suggests a narrower construction, one founded on the 
realities of litigation and the true interests of finality.  This construction, 
which limits the Ackermann rule to those movants who deliberately stop 
pursuing their claims, opens space for a more equitable consideration of 




  545 U.S. 524, 537–38 (2005). 
33
  Reasonable minds could disagree with the Court’s disposition in these cases.  I do not mean to 
defend them.  I only mean to distinguish them from Aikens and argue that, even if they are correct, they 
do not justify the expansive rule that the Fourth Circuit promulgated in Aikens. 
